Persuasion and Welfare

Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of heterogeneous individuals. We define and characterize the Baye...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2023-09
Main Authors: Doval, Laura, Smolin, Alex
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Policies
Ratings
Recommender systems
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of heterogeneous individuals. We define and characterize the Bayes welfare set, consisting of the population's utility profiles that are feasible under some information policy. The Pareto frontier of this set can be recovered by a series of standard Bayesian persuasion problems, in which a utilitarian planner takes the role of the information designer. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an information policy exists that Pareto dominates the no-information policy. We illustrate our results with applications to data leakage, price discrimination, and credit ratings.
ISSN:2331-8422