Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q-learning under sequential pricing

Prices are increasingly set by algorithms. One concern is that intelligent algorithms may learn to collude on higher prices even in the absence of the kind of coordination necessary to establish an antitrust infringement. However, exactly how this may happen is an open question. I show how in simula...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Rand journal of economics 2021-10, Vol.52 (3), p.538-558
Main Author: Klein, Timo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Collusion
Coordination
Infringement
Intelligence
Learning
Prices
Reinforcement
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