Simulating trans-boundary watershed water resources conflict

• Published in: Resources policy 2021-10, Vol.73, p.102139, Article 102139
• Main Authors: Lu, Shibao, Lian, Zhiduan, Sun, Huaping, Wu, Xiaohe, Bai, Xiao, Wang, Congcong
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Boundaries; Conflict; Control; Cooperation; Economic development; Evolution; Game; Game theory; Games; Mathematical models; Moisture content; Resource management; River basins; Simulation; Verification; Water intakes; Water resources conflict; Water resources development; Water resources management; Water resources system; Water supply
• ISSN: 0301-4207; 1873-7641
• DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2021.102139

With the rapid development of economy, the water shortage and water intake competition have been further intensified, resulting in the conflict of water resources development. This paper, against the amount of water conflict, has respectively constructed the three-party evolutionary game model regarding the water intake condition at the upper, middle and lower reaches of the river basin from the perspective of evolutionary game theory, verified the related conclusions with the numerical simulation. The conclusions of the research are as follows: (1) There are four sets of system local asymptotic stability points P20,0,1, P40,1,1,P61,0,1 and P81,1,1 in the three-party game of amount of water based trans-boundary water resources conflict, which means there existed four sets of evolutionary stable strategies (non-cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation), (non-cooperation, cooperation, cooperation), (cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation), and (cooperation, cooperation, cooperation). After the verification with the numerical simulation, the most contradictory area is existed between the upper and middle reaches of the river basin. Thus, the selected choice is (non-cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation); (2) as for the amount of water based trans-boundary water resources conflict, the cost of cooperation water intake C1 has a significant impact on the strategy evolutionary path of the water intake group. This is of great theoretical and practical significance for the scientific regulation of trans-boundary water resources conflict and the realization of water resource management goals. •The paper establishes a three-party evolutionary game model.•There existed four sets of evolutionary stable strategies in the three-party game.•Cooperation cost is of great significance to the scientific regulation of water resources conflict.