Re Imogen: the role of the Family Court of Australia in disputes over gender dysphoria treatment

This article examines Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344, a decision of the Family Court of Australia, which held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of a child or adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the capacit...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Monash bioethics review 2021-12, Vol.39 (Suppl 1), p.42-66
Main Authors: Dimopoulos, Georgina, Taylor-Sands, Michelle
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adolescents
Autonomy
Children
Diagnosis
Education
Ethics
Family law
Gender
Gender dysphoria
Medical treatment
Original Article
Philosophy
State court decisions
Teenagers
Theory of Medicine/Bioethics
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Summary:This article examines Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344, a decision of the Family Court of Australia, which held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of a child or adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. First, we explain the regulatory framework for the medical treatment of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, including the development of the welfare jurisdiction under Section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). We then provide an overview of the Re Imogen decision, and discuss the balancing exercise involved in determining a child’s best interests in the medical treatment context. We challenge the Family Court’s conclusion that, in relation to a dispute about diagnosis or treatment, a finding that the child or adolescent is Gillick competent to consent to treatment is not determinative, and the Family Court must determine the dispute. We argue that this conclusion represents an unjustified incursion into the right of Gillick competent transgender children and adolescents to make decisions about their own bodies and identities, and that the protective role of parents and the Family Court cannot justify interfering with their bodily autonomy in this context. Finally, we propose an alternative regulatory framework that removes the Family Court from the medical treatment process for gender dysphoria in circumstances of dispute between a parent and their Gillick competent child.
ISSN:1321-2753
1836-6716
DOI:10.1007/s40592-021-00138-0