For whom the bell tolls: Party mediation effects on economic voting in a large democratic federation

• Published in: Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.) Ga.), 2022-04, Vol.50 (2), p.324-362
• Main Authors: Fernandes, Ivan Filipe, Fernandes, Gustavo Andrey De Almeida Lopes, Zimerman, Artur
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Aggregate data; Alianzas; alliances; Brasil; Brazil; comparative politics; Democracia/Democratización; democracy/democratization; Economic growth; Economic performance; economic voting; economics/economic policy; Economía/Política económica; Elecciones/Sistema electoral/Política electoral; elections/electoral system/electoral policy; Estados; Federación; Federalism; federation; Governors; Health care; Interdependence; Land reform; Latin America; municipalities; Municipios; National health insurance; Panel data; Partidos políticos; Partisanship; Polarization; political parties; Political systems; Politics; Presidential elections; Presidential systems; states; Tolls; Voting; Voto económico; 州; 巴西; 市镇; 政治党派; 民主/民主化; 经济学/经济政策; 经济投票; 联盟; 联邦; 选举/选举系统/选举政策
• ISSN: 1555-5623; 1747-1346
• DOI: 10.1111/polp.12453

This article analyzes the effect of economic growth on executive elections in the context of a multilevel governance structure and how party ties across federal, state, and local levels affect the relationship, using data from Brazilian municipalities. We test the hypothesis that the president is the main politician accountable for economic performance, measured by local growth, and that party politics moderates the evaluation of the economic performance of state governors and the president. Our research shows that there is a high degree of interdependence between levels of government in the evaluation of economic performance. We highlight how party alliances strongly moderate the economic performance effects at the different levels. Using aggregate local level‐municipality panel data and fixed effects estimations, we show that the previous year's economic growth positively impacts the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent in the presidential elections and that those effects are higher in states whose governors are allied to the president. Related Articles Ondetti, Gabriel. 2008. “Up and Down with the Agrarian Question: Issue Attention and Land Reform in Contemporary Brazil.” Politics & Policy 36(4): 510–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00120.x Segatto, Catarina Ianni, and Daniel Béland. 2018. “The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 46(3): 416–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252 Zimerman, Artur, and Flávio Pinheiro. 2020. “Appearances can be Deceptive: Political Polarization, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 48(2): 339–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12345 Por quién suenan las campanas: efectos de la mediación partidaria en el voto económico en una gran federación democrática El documento analiza el efecto del crecimiento económico en las elecciones ejecutivas en el contexto de una estructura de gobernanza multinivel y cómo los vínculos entre partidos en los niveles federal, estatal y local afectan la relación, utilizando datos de los municipios brasileños. Probamos la hipótesis de que el presidente es el principal político responsable del desempeño económico, medido por el crecimiento local, y que la política de partidos modera la evaluación del desempeño económico de los gobernadores estatales y del presidente. Nuestra investigación muestra que existe un alto grado de interdependencia