Body Model and Biosynthetic Devices: Interpreting Technological Incorporation with the Help of Edmund Husserl's Genetic Phenomenology

The body model is a relatively new concept, which originates from the science of human embodiment. Cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists that work in this research field usually interpret the concept of body model as an internal model or reference description of anatomical, volumetric and stru...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Agathos : an international review of the humanities and social sciences 2022-01, Vol.13 (1), p.41-60
Main Author: Properzi, Martina
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anatomical systems
Cognitive ability
Embodiment
Genetics
Human body
Husserl, Edmund (1859-1938)
Mechanical properties
Phenomenology
Prosthetic devices
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Summary:The body model is a relatively new concept, which originates from the science of human embodiment. Cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists that work in this research field usually interpret the concept of body model as an internal model or reference description of anatomical, volumetric and structural properties of human corporality. It has been demonstrated that the body model plays a normative role in shaping a pre-reflective sense of body ownership, which is centrally involved in the lived experience of incorporating ('phenomenal incorporation') medical devices, such as prostheses or implants. Further investigation is required to understand the normativity of the body model, especially in relation to the emerging generation of so-called biosynthetic devices designed to lead physiological and phenomenal incorporation to a qualitatively higher degree compared to traditional medical devices. The main objective of this article is to contribute to a critical analysis of the normative role of the body model in the phenomenal incorporation of biosynthetic devices. My starting point is an interdisciplinary methodology, which is inspired by that developed by postphenomenologists such as Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek. I will adopt, however, a classically inspired critical perspective of which postphenomenology has proved to be lacking. More specifically, I will use as a reference frame for critical analysis the genetic phenomenology of human embodiment, which was developed by the founder of classical phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, in a mature phase of his production.
ISSN:2069-1025
2248-3446