Stereotypes, Ingroup Emotions and the Inner Predictive Machinery of Testimony

The reductionist/anti-reductionist debate about testimonial justification (and knowledge) can be taken to collapse into a controversy about two kinds of underlying monitoring mechanism. The nature and structure of this mechanism remains an enigma in the debate. We suggest that the underlying monitor...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Topoi 2022-11, Vol.41 (5), p.871-882
Main Authors: Araya, José M., Palacios, Simón
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Emotions
Epistemology
Hypotheses
Knowledge
Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Technology
Reductionism
Stereotypes
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Summary:The reductionist/anti-reductionist debate about testimonial justification (and knowledge) can be taken to collapse into a controversy about two kinds of underlying monitoring mechanism. The nature and structure of this mechanism remains an enigma in the debate. We suggest that the underlying monitoring mechanism amounts to emotion-based stereotyping. Our main argument in favor of the stereotype hypothesis about testimonial monitoring is that the underlying psychological mechanism responsible for testimonial monitoring has several conditions to satisfy. Each of these conditions is satisfied by our “hot” stereotypical capacities. Intergroup emotions play a key role here. Intergroup emotions inform the agent about which candidate stereotype is better suited to the current situation. Emotions serve as evidence that makes a certain stereotype and its particular profile of features more or less expected.
ISSN:0167-7411
1572-8749
DOI:10.1007/s11245-022-09798-x