Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior

Paying resource users to preserve features of their environment could in theory better align production and conservation goals. We show, however, that across a range of conservation dilemmas, they might not. We conduct a synthesis of dynamic games experiments built around collective action dilemmas...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Communications earth & environment 2023-12, Vol.4 (1), p.27-12, Article 27
Main Authors: Bell, Andrew Reid, Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy, Bhargava, Apurva, Duthie, A. Bradley, Zhang, Wei, Sargent, Rebecca, Lewis, Amy R., Kipchumba, Adams
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agricultural production
Collective action
Conservation
Conservation practices
Games
Gender
Incentives
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