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Third Parties Are Supportive of Social Movement's Use of Violence When It Previously Used Nonviolence (but Failed to Achieve Change)

Across four experimental studies (NStudy 1 = 466, a hypothetical movement in Bhutan, NStudy 2 = 447, a hypothetical movement in the United Kingdom, NStudy 3 = 463, a hypothetical movement in Bhutan, NStudy 4 = 460, a real movement in the United States) and an integrated data analysis, we examined wh...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Peace and conflict 2023-11, Vol.29 (4), p.409-419
Main Authors: Orazani, Seyed Nima, Wohl, Michael J. A., Leidner, Bernhard
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Across four experimental studies (NStudy 1 = 466, a hypothetical movement in Bhutan, NStudy 2 = 447, a hypothetical movement in the United Kingdom, NStudy 3 = 463, a hypothetical movement in Bhutan, NStudy 4 = 460, a real movement in the United States) and an integrated data analysis, we examined when third parties (i.e., those who are not actively engaged in the movement) will support a social movement that permits the use of violence. In Studies 1-3, third parties were more willing to support violence when it was framed as having shifted to violence when nonviolence failed to achieve their goals. Mediation analyses revealed that a shift toward permitting violence reduced support to the extent that the shift created perceived moral decline in the social movement (Studies 1-3), but increased when the shift was perceived to be a last resort (Study 3). Last, we showed (Study 4) most effects disappear when third parties are told that they may be in close proximity to the violence (Study 4). These suggest third parties can and do support the use of violence as well as when and why such support is offered. Public Significance Statement This study suggests that people may be more supportive of a historically nonviolent social movement who recently change its strategy to violence as opposed to a historically violent movement. Moreover, changing strategy from nonviolence to violence damages the moral image of the movement and leads to receiving less support from the third party observers. Policy makers and movement leaders may take into account the history of the movement and potential consequences of changing strategy from nonviolent to violence.
ISSN:1078-1919
1532-7949
DOI:10.1037/pac0000654