Subnational-level government influence and FDI location choices: The moderating roles of resource dependence relations

By linking the resource dependence perspective with research on foreign direct investment location choices, we analyze how the dependence relationship between the home country of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and a subnational-level host location moderates the effect of local government enticemen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of international business studies 2023-08, Vol.54 (6), p.1027-1054
Main Authors: Yao, Fiona Kun, Xie, Luqun, Li, Jiatao, Xu, Mingrui
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Business and Management
Business Strategy/Leadership
Deterrence
Foreign investment
International Business
Local government
Localization
Management
Multinational corporations
Organization
Ventures
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Summary:By linking the resource dependence perspective with research on foreign direct investment location choices, we analyze how the dependence relationship between the home country of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and a subnational-level host location moderates the effect of local government enticement and deterrence signals on the MNE’s investment in a specific location. Specifically, we differentiate between two dimensions of the dependence relationship between an MNE home country and a subnational host location joint dependence and dependence asymmetry. Moreover, we examine the directionality of dependence asymmetry by distinguishing between the dependence advantage of a home country and that of a subnational host location. A sample of foreign manufacturing ventures across cities in China from 2003 to 2017 provides the empirical context for our investigation. Joint dependence and dependence asymmetry moderate the effects of local government signals on foreign investment location decisions. Although joint dependence enhances the positive effect of government enticement signals and mitigates the negative effect of government deterrence signals on foreign investments, dependence asymmetry affects the impacts of government enticement and deterrence signals differently, depending on which actor holds the dependence advantage.
ISSN:0047-2506
1478-6990
DOI:10.1057/s41267-022-00591-x