Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression

• Published in: The Southern journal of philosophy 2023-06, Vol.61 (2), p.373-389
• Main Author: Mackenzie, Catriona
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Argumentation; Bodily integrity; Human agency; Intentionality; Narratives; Philosophy; Plot (Narrative); Social conditions & trends
• ISSN: 0038-4283; 2041-6962
• DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12521

Theories of collective intentionality and theories of relational autonomy share a common interest in analyzing the social dynamics of agency. However, whereas theories of collective intentionality conceive of social groups primarily as intentional and voluntarily willed, theories of relational autonomy claim that autonomous agency is both scaffolded and constrained by social forces and structures, including the constraints imposed by nonvoluntary group membership. The question raised by this difference in view is whether social theorizing that overlooks the effects of nonvoluntary social group membership on individual and joint agency overlooks crucial aspects of the social dynamics of agency. To explore this question, this article first evaluates Michael Bratman's planning analysis of individual agency from the perspective of relational autonomy theory and compares it with a narrative self‐constitution account of temporally extended agency. It then evaluates Bratman's analysis of shared agency and discusses Shaun Gallagher and Deborah Tollefsen's concept of we‐narratives, which extends the notion of narrative construction to shared agency. Overall, the argument aims to show that if we are interested in understanding the social dynamics of agency, it is critical to attend to the way that agents exercise their intentional agency in relation to internalized and external social constraints.