Aesthetic Value: Why Pleasure Counts

An object has aesthetic value (henceforth: a-value) because a certain sort of cognitive engagement with it is beneficial. This grounding in mental activity explains why a-valuable objects are so diverse. The Himalayas are descriptively as different as can be from Pythagoras’s proof. Yet both are a-v...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of aesthetics and art criticism 2023-05, Vol.81 (1), p.89-90
Main Author: Matthen, Mohan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aesthetics
Attitudes
Cognition & reasoning
Happiness
Values
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Summary:An object has aesthetic value (henceforth: a-value) because a certain sort of cognitive engagement with it is beneficial. This grounding in mental activity explains why a-valuable objects are so diverse. The Himalayas are descriptively as different as can be from Pythagoras’s proof. Yet both are a-valuable. The commonality rests in our mental attitudes to them.What do the mental attitudes that ground a-value share? In my view, a certain kind of pleasure. Until relatively recently, this approach was thought to be validated by intuition and self-examination. Most philosophers felt they could leave it at that. This is unsatisfactory: aesthetic hedonism needs support and elaboration. I will try to bridge the gap.IIAn inanimate object, o, has value for a subject, s, when s’s relationship (R) to o brings her a benefit (B). In the case of a-value, R is aesthetic engagement. My view is that B is pleasure.
ISSN:0021-8529
1540-6245
DOI:10.1093/jaac/kpac061