BVOT: self-tallying boardroom voting with oblivious transfer

A boardroom election is an election with a small number of voters carried out with public communications. We present BVOT, a self-tallying boardroom voting protocol with ballot secrecy, fairness, and dispute-freeness. BVOT works by using a multiparty threshold homomorphic encryption system in which...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Information security journal. 2024-01, Vol.ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print), p.1-12
Main Authors: Javani, Farid, Sherman, Alan T.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied cryptography
boardroom voting
election systems
Elections
oblivious transfer
Voters
Voting
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:A boardroom election is an election with a small number of voters carried out with public communications. We present BVOT, a self-tallying boardroom voting protocol with ballot secrecy, fairness, and dispute-freeness. BVOT works by using a multiparty threshold homomorphic encryption system in which each candidate is associated with a set of masked primes. Each voter engages in an oblivious transfer with an untrusted distributor: the voter selects the index of a prime associated with a candidate and receives the selected prime in masked form. The voter then casts their vote by encrypting their masked prime and broadcasting it to everyone. By hiding the mapping between primes and candidates, BVOT provides voters with insufficient information to carry out effective cheating. The threshold feature prevents anyone from computing any partial tally-until everyone has voted. In contrast to some existing boardroom voting protocols, BVOT does not rely on any zero-knowledge proof; instead, it uses oblivious transfer to assure ballot secrecy and correct vote casting. Also, BVOT can handle multiple candidates in one election. BVOT prevents cheating by hiding crucial information: an attempt to increase the tally of one candidate might increase the tally of another candidate.
ISSN:1939-3555
1939-3547
DOI:10.1080/19393555.2022.2138798