Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game

This paper contributes to the question whether plea bargaining is compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. We stylize inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two impartial investigators, judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a co...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of law and economics 2023-12, Vol.56 (3), p.497-532
Main Author: Christmann, Robin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Commercial Law
Coordination
Court hearings & proceedings
Criminal investigations
Criminal law
Criminal pleas
Criminal procedure
Defendants
Economics
Economics and Finance
European Integration
Evidence
False arrests & convictions
Games
Guilt
Judges & magistrates
Law and Economics
Moral hazard
Plea bargaining
Public Finance
Public prosecutors
Traditions
Trials
Verification
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:This paper contributes to the question whether plea bargaining is compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. We stylize inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two impartial investigators, judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a correct decision over a defendant of uncertain guilt. Our analysis shows that the introduction of plea deals in courtroom helps to overcome the problem of effort coordination between the two agents. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of plea deals reduces the number of wrongful convictions, but this comes at the cost of some guilty defendants getting away unpunished. Our results are robust to small decision errors by the players and attorney moral hazard. We further consider the implications of imperfect verification skills by judges, different timing of deals, or prosecutors who just seek to maximize convictions and guilty pleas.
ISSN:0929-1261
1572-9990
1572-9346
DOI:10.1007/s10657-023-09782-9