On designing an unaided authentication service with threat detection and leakage control for defeating opportunistic adversaries

• Published in: Frontiers of Computer Science 2021-04, Vol.15 (2), p.152803, Article 152803
• Main Authors: CHAKRABORTY, Nilesh, MONDAL, Samrat
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Access control; Authentication; Complexity; Computer Science; Leakage; leakage control; opportunistic adversary; Passwords; premature attack; Recording; recording attack; Research Article; Resilience; Security; threat detection; threat prevention; Usability
• ISSN: 2095-2228; 2095-2236
• DOI: 10.1007/s11704-019-9134-9

Unaided authentication services provide the flexibility to login without being dependent on any additional device. The power of recording attack resilient unaided authentication services (RARUAS) is undeniable as, in some aspects, they are even capable of offering better security than the biometric based authentication systems. However, high login complexity of these RARUAS makes them far from usable in practice. The adopted information leakage control strategies have often been identified as the primary cause behind such high login complexities. Though recent proposals havemade some significant efforts in designing a usable RARUAS by reducing its login complexity, most of them have failed to achieve the desired usability standard. In this paper, we have introduced a new notion of controlling the information leakage rate. By maintaining a good security standard, the introduced idea helps to reduce the login complexity of our proposed mechanism − named as Textual-Graphical Password-based Mechanism or TGPM, by a significant extent. Along with resisting the recording attack, TGPM also achieves a remarkable property of threat detection. To the best of our knowledge, TGPM is the first RARUAS, which can both prevent and detect the activities of the opportunistic recording attackers who can record the complete login activity of a genuine user for a few login sessions. Our study reveals that TGPM assures much higher session resiliency compared to the existing authentication services, having the same or even higher login complexities. Moreover, TGPM stores the password information in a distributed way and thus restricts the adversaries to learn the complete secret from a single compromised server. A thorough theoretical analysis has been performed to prove the strength of our proposal from both the security and usability perspectives. We have also conducted an experimental study to support the theoretical argument made on the usability standard of TGPM.