The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique

• Published in: Review of philosophy and psychology 2024-03, Vol.15 (1), p.167-188
• Main Author: Wehinger, Daniel
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Consciousness; Developmental Psychology; Education; Epistemology; Neurosciences; Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science
• ISSN: 1878-5158; 1878-5166
• DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6

The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of mineness , has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018 , p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate the claim of an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Since the transcendental argument is depicted as the “central argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018 , p. 711), I contend that, in view of its failure, the claim that all of my experiences have to be given to me as mine , all of your experiences have to be given to you as yours , etc., appears insufficiently substantiated. The idea that there is an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness must be called into question.