Physicalism, Infinite Decomposition, and Constitution

How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Erkenntnis 2024-04, Vol.89 (4), p.1735-1744
Main Authors: Alter, Torin, Coleman, Sam, Howell, Robert J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognitive ability
Critical Discussion
Decomposition
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Logic
Ontology
Philosophy
Physical properties
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Summary:How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown’s example: physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical phenomena if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentally constituted mentality. This solution is independently plausible and is available to physicalists of virtually all significant varieties.
ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-022-00582-2