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Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants

This introduction highlights conceptions of the liberal international order (LIO) among small, middle and major Asian nation-states. Contrary to western scepticism, Asian powers are largely supportive of the LIO. Their stance is often driven by domestic politics and desire to have a voice in the int...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International affairs (London) 2023-07, Vol.99 (4), p.1371-1381
Main Authors: Bajpai, Kanti, Laksmana, Evan A
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:This introduction highlights conceptions of the liberal international order (LIO) among small, middle and major Asian nation-states. Contrary to western scepticism, Asian powers are largely supportive of the LIO. Their stance is often driven by domestic politics and desire to have a voice in the international order. Abstract How do major Asian states regard the current international security order? Do they agree or disagree among themselves? This is an introduction to a special section on ‘Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants’. It draws on articles analysing the stances of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam towards the existing international security order usually described as a liberal international order (LIO). It argues that Asian states substantially support the main constitutive and regulatory norms and institutions of the LIO, but they worry that the LIO does not consistently honour these norms. Asians disagree on the centrality of political liberalism, but even Japan and South Korea, the most liberal states, are uncomfortable with strident criticism, punishment and the exclusion of less liberal states. Asians also disagree on the role of US alliances: some are strongly supportive, some are ambivalent and some are negative. Finally, Asians disagree on how they voice dissatisfaction. Japan and South Korea supplement existing norms and institutions as a way of transcending the limitations of the LIO; south-east Asian states promote ASEAN's mediatory role for peace and security above and beyond existing global arrangements; and Indonesia, India and China want to move from being norm takers to becoming norm shapers. The introduction ends with six policy implications.
ISSN:0020-5850
1468-2346
DOI:10.1093/ia/iiad165