Social benefits for European Union immigrants? A survey experiment on misperceptions

Using new experimental panel data for Germany, I investigate the role of income misperceptions for welfare restrictive preferences toward European Union immigrants. A majority of respondents misperceive their relative income position in Germany and the European Union and demand that European Union i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European Union politics 2024-06, Vol.25 (2), p.333-353
Main Author: Jäger, Julian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Immigrants
Income distribution
Income inequality
Panel data
Respondents
Taxation
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Summary:Using new experimental panel data for Germany, I investigate the role of income misperceptions for welfare restrictive preferences toward European Union immigrants. A majority of respondents misperceive their relative income position in Germany and the European Union and demand that European Union immigrants work and pay taxes before obtaining equal rights to social benefits. Randomized treatments inform subjects about their position in the national and European Union income distribution. My results provide evidence that welfare restrictive preferences are formed in the context of misperceived own income positions: Respondents become more welfare restrictive when they learn about a higher national or lower European Union income position. Information about European Union misperceptions has a persistent treatment effect after 3 months, driven by respondents with larger initial misperceptions, but becomes insignificant after one year.
ISSN:1465-1165
1741-2757
DOI:10.1177/14651165241229593