Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy

The received view of Kant's moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person's ability to do...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of philosophy 2024-06, Vol.32 (2), p.353-359
Main Author: Hartman, Robert J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Chance
Ethics
Freedoms
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)
Morality
Philosophy
Probability
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Summary:The received view of Kant's moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person's ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to circumstantial and constitutive luck provide a reason to accept a pro‐moral luck interpretation of Kant.
ISSN:0966-8373
1468-0378
DOI:10.1111/ejop.12844