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The distance-bounding protocol based on Russian cryptographic algorithms

In distance-bounding authentication protocols the Prover has to prove not only that it is a legitimate participant, but also that it is in a legitimate zone (e.g., in close proximity to the Verifier). Conventional authentication protocols are not designed to deal with the location of protocol partie...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques 2024, Vol.20 (3), p.485-495
Main Authors: Belsky, Vladimir, Chichaeva, Anastasiia, Shishkin, Vasily, Tsaregorodtsev, Kirill
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:In distance-bounding authentication protocols the Prover has to prove not only that it is a legitimate participant, but also that it is in a legitimate zone (e.g., in close proximity to the Verifier). Conventional authentication protocols are not designed to deal with the location of protocol parties. Using such protocols in case of RFID systems makes them vulnerable to simple relay attacks, which is a significant threat. Protocols that combine cryptographic mechanisms with technical measurements (e.g., time-of-flight or GPS location of the Prover) are often used to protect against relay attacks. In this paper we analyse existing distance-bounding authentication protocols and propose a new DB - RFID distance-bounding protocol for RFID systems. DB - RFID protocol develops the ideas of the most prominent Swiss-Knife protocol, which protects against a greater number of possible attacks. We also provide an initial security analysis of the protocol and propose a version of the protocol based on Russian standardized cryptographic algorithms.
ISSN:2263-8733
2263-8733
DOI:10.1007/s11416-024-00524-2