Capitals as bad equilibria

Throughout the recent pandemic, governments used digital video technologies to facilitate social distancing during political meetings. In addition to enabling social distancing, a theoretical advantage of virtual political governance is that it has the potential to mitigate the hierarchical administ...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American journal of economics and sociology 2024-11, Vol.83 (5), p.947-954
Main Author: Meling, Ådne
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Centralization
Digital technology
Equilibrium
Governance
Hierarchies
Pandemics
Prices
Real estate
Social distancing
Wealth
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Summary:Throughout the recent pandemic, governments used digital video technologies to facilitate social distancing during political meetings. In addition to enabling social distancing, a theoretical advantage of virtual political governance is that it has the potential to mitigate the hierarchical administrative relationship between capitals and regions and the differences in real estate prices and wealth that often follows from such hierarchical structures. However, hardly any governments are currently planning a long‐term transition to work‐from‐home digital governance. On the contrary, several countries are doubling down on the centralization model of government by building new capitals in new locations. This article proposes that in a time of digital alternatives, physically centralized “capitals” could be considered examples of bad equilibrium.
ISSN:0002-9246
1536-7150
DOI:10.1111/ajes.12560