Meritocracy as Authoritarian Co-Optation: Political Selection and Upward Mobility in China

Why does an authoritarian regime adopt meritocracy in its political selection? I argue that meritocracy can be used to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by providing them with an opportunity of socioeconomic advancement instead of income redistribution, as long as the selection process is vi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American political science review 2024-11, Vol.118 (4), p.1856-1872
Main Author: LIU, HANZHANG
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authoritarianism
Beliefs
Civil service
College graduates
Income redistribution
Inequality
Meritocracy
Mobility
National Surveys
Patronage
Preferences
Social mobility
Socioeconomic factors
Standardized Tests
State Surveys
Student Surveys
Upward mobility
Welfare
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Summary:Why does an authoritarian regime adopt meritocracy in its political selection? I argue that meritocracy can be used to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by providing them with an opportunity of socioeconomic advancement instead of income redistribution, as long as the selection process is viewed as inclusive and rule-based. Focusing on the civil service examination in contemporary China, I examine how this meritocratic selection has shaped the relationship between college graduates and the Chinese regime. Exploiting a spatial-cohort variation in applicant eligibility, I find that the exam boosts college graduates’ perceived upward mobility, which in turn weakens their demand for redistribution even in the face of growing inequality. These findings point to an alternative mode of authoritarian co-optation and highlight the role of upward mobility in regime stability.
ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.1017/S000305542300120X