Diachronicity Matters! How Semantics Supports Discontinuism About Remembering and Imagining

• Published in: Topoi 2024-10, Vol.43 (4), p.1137-1159
• Main Authors: Liefke, Kristina, Werning, Markus
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Education; Imagination; Memory; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of Technology; Semantics
• ISSN: 0167-7411; 1572-8749
• DOI: 10.1007/s11245-024-10068-1

Much work in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience has argued for continuism about remembering and imagining (see, e.g., Addis J R Soc N Z 48(2–3):64–88, 2018). This view claims that episodic remembering is just a form of imagining, such that memory does not have a privileged status over other forms of episodic simulation (esp. imagination). Large parts of contemporary philosophy of memory support continuism. This even holds for work in semantics and the philosophy of language, which has pointed out substantial similarities in the distribution of the verbs remember and imagine . Our paper argues against the continuist claim, by focusing on a previously neglected source of evidence for dis continuism: the semantics of episodic memory and imagination reports. We argue that, in contrast to imagination reports, episodic memory reports are essentially diachronic, in the sense that their truth requires a foregoing reference-fixing experience. In this respect, they differ from reports of experiential imagination, which is paradigmatically synchronic. To defend our claim about this difference in diachronicity, we study the truth-conditions of episodic memory and imagination reports. We develop a semantics for episodic uses of remember and imagine that captures this difference.