The interval Shapley value: an axiomatization

The Shapley value, one of the most widespread concepts in operations Research applications of cooperative game theory, was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. Recently much research work has been done in order to extend OR models and methods, in particular coo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Central European journal of operations research 2010-06, Vol.18 (2), p.131-140
Main Authors: Alparslan Gök, S. Z., Branzei, R., Tijs, S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Airports
Analysis
Business and Management
Computer science
Cooperation
Expected values
Game theory
Management research
Operations research
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Studies
Uncertainty (Information theory)
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Summary:The Shapley value, one of the most widespread concepts in operations Research applications of cooperative game theory, was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. Recently much research work has been done in order to extend OR models and methods, in particular cooperative game theory, for situations with interval data. This paper focuses on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. The interval Shapley value is characterized with the aid of the properties of additivity, efficiency, symmetry and dummy player, which are straightforward generalizations of the corresponding properties in the classical cooperative game theory.
ISSN:1435-246X
1613-9178
DOI:10.1007/s10100-009-0096-0