Securing Dynamic Distributed Storage Systems Against Eavesdropping and Adversarial Attacks

We address the problem of securing distributed storage systems against eavesdropping and adversarial attacks. An important aspect of these systems is node failures over time, necessitating, thus, a repair mechanism in order to maintain a desired high system reliability. In such dynamic settings, an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on information theory 2011-10, Vol.57 (10), p.6734-6753
Main Authors: Pawar, S., El Rouayheb, S., Ramchandran, K.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Bandwidth
Byzantine adversary
Decision support systems
distributed storage
Exact sciences and technology
Information storage
Information theory
Information, signal and communications theory
Maintenance engineering
network codes
Peer to peer computing
Reliability
secrecy
Secret
Secure storage
Security systems
Systems, networks and services of telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
Upper bound
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Summary:We address the problem of securing distributed storage systems against eavesdropping and adversarial attacks. An important aspect of these systems is node failures over time, necessitating, thus, a repair mechanism in order to maintain a desired high system reliability. In such dynamic settings, an important security problem is to safeguard the system from an intruder who may come at different time instances during the lifetime of the storage system to observe and possibly alter the data stored on some nodes. In this scenario, we give upper bounds on the maximum amount of information that can be stored safely on the system. For an important operating regime of the distributed storage system, which we call the bandwidth-limited regime, we show that our upper bounds are tight and provide explicit code constructions. Moreover, we provide a way to short list the malicious nodes and expurgate the system.
ISSN:0018-9448
1557-9654
DOI:10.1109/TIT.2011.2162191