A FOREIGN POLICY FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION: Mexico's Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959—1969

• Published in: Latin American research review 2012-01, Vol.47 (2), p.100-119
• Main Author: Keller, Renata
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Bgi / Prodig; Castro, Fidel; Communism; Consumption; Control; Cooperation; Cuba; Decision making; Decisions; Domestic consumption; Foreign Policy; Government; Government agencies; Government officials; Government relations; Human geography; Ideology; Intelligence; Intelligence gathering; Intelligence services; International relations; International relations-US; Left Wing Politics; Left-wing parties; Leftism; Liberalism; Mexico; National security; Negotiation; Political activism; Political and economic geography; Political aspects; Political geography; Political protests; Political revolutions; Politics; Postcolonialism; Presidents; Revolutions; Threat; Threats; United States of America; Verbal aggression
• ISSN: 0023-8791; 1542-4278; 1542-4278
• DOI: 10.1353/lar.2012.0003

This article brings new evidence and a revisionary argument to the debate over Mexico's exceptional relations with Cuba in the decade after the Cuban Revolution. It uses recently declassified Mexican intelligence records to show that Mexican leaders defended Castro primarily because they were afraid of domestic leftist groups and individuals. The first part of the article examines the intelligence information that Mexican decision makers received about internal threats, drawing out the connections that they perceived between Cuba and the Mexican left and the reasons they designed their foreign policy for domestic ends. The second section shifts to the international level, challenging the traditional arguments that foreign or ideological factors determined Mexico's policy toward Cuba. It examines the ways that Mexican leaders defused and negotiated against possible repercussions from Cuba or the United States as a result of their decision to maintain relations with Castro's government. Este artículo ofrece nuevas evidencias y un argumento revisionista al debate sobre las relaciones excepcionales entre México y Cuba durante la década siguiente a la revolución cubana. Con base en documentos recién desclasificados de los servicios mexicanos de inteligencia, el artículo muestra que los líderes mexicanos defendieron a Castro fundamentalmente porque tenían miedo de los grupos y activistas de la izquierda local. La primera parte del artículo examina la información que los líderes mexicanos recibieron sobre amenazas internas y las razones por las cuales diseñaron su política exterior con fines domésticos. La segunda parte cuestiona el argumento tradicional de que ciertos factores externos o ideológicos determinaron la política mexicana hacia Cuba, y también examina cómo los líderes mexicanos se prepararon contra las posibles repercusiones desde Cuba o los Estados Unidos que podían haber resultado de la decisión mexicana de mantener relaciones con el gobierno de Castro.