The original Borda count and partial voting

In a Borda count, BC, M. de Borda suggested the last preference cast should receive 1 point, the voter's penultimate ranking should get 2 points, and so on. Today, however, points are often awarded to (first, second,..., last) preferences cast as per(n,n−1, ..., 1) or more frequently, (n−1, n−2...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2013-02, Vol.40 (2), p.353-358
Main Author: Emerson, Peter
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ballots
Candidates
Democracy
Economic models
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Elections
Electoral systems
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Majority voting
Plurality voting
Political economy
Political parties
Preferences
Preferential voting
Public choice
Public Finance
Ranking
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
Social welfare
Studies
Voter behavior
Voters
Votes
Voting
Voting behaviour
Voting paradox
Welfare economics
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:In a Borda count, BC, M. de Borda suggested the last preference cast should receive 1 point, the voter's penultimate ranking should get 2 points, and so on. Today, however, points are often awarded to (first, second,..., last) preferences cast as per(n,n−1, ..., 1) or more frequently, (n−1, n−2,..., 0). If partial voting¹ is allowed, and if a first preference is to be given n or n − 1 points regardless of how many preferences the voter casts, he/she will be incentivised to rank only one option/candidate. If everyone acts in this way, the BC metamorphoses into a plurality vote... which de Borda criticized at length. If all the voters submit full ballots, the outcome—social choice or ranking—will be the same under any of the above three counting procedures. In the event of one or more persons submitting a partial vote, however, outcomes may vary considerably. This preliminary paper suggests research should consider partial voting. The author examines the consequences of the various rules so far advocated and then purports that M. de Borda, in using his formula, was perhaps more astute than the science has hitherto recognised.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9