A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, wea...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2013-03, Vol.40 (3), p.871-911
Main Authors: Morimoto, Shuhei, Serizawa, Shigehiro, Ching, Stephen
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency
Ambivalence
Commodities
Consumption
Coordinate systems
Economic modeling
Economic resources
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Efficient strategies
Fairness
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Multidimensional analysis
Original Paper
Pareto efficiency
Preferences
Private goods
Public choice
Public Finance
Resource allocation
Rules
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Class
Social Policy
Social welfare
Studies
Symmetry
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Summary:We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and non-bossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9