Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership

This paper extends the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94:768–776, 2010 ), which argues that under capital tax competition the sub-game perfect equilibria (SPEs) correspond to two Stackelberg outcomes. The findings show that the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi result depends on the form of ca...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:International tax and public finance 2013-06, Vol.20 (3), p.474-484
Main Author: Ogawa, Hikaru
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Business Taxation/Tax Law
Capital tax
Competition
Economic equilibrium
Economic policy
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Game theory
GNP
Government
Gross National Product
Incentives
Leadership
Ownership
Per capita
Public Finance
Studies
Tax competition
Tax rates
Taxation
Terms of trade
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This paper extends the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94:768–776, 2010 ), which argues that under capital tax competition the sub-game perfect equilibria (SPEs) correspond to two Stackelberg outcomes. The findings show that the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi result depends on the form of capital ownership. By generalizing the form of capital ownership, this paper shows that the simultaneous-move outcome prevails as an SPE if the capital is owned by residents in the countries, whereas the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi argument holds if the capital is owned by nonresidents.
ISSN:0927-5940
1573-6970
DOI:10.1007/s10797-012-9238-8