Using suggestion to modulate automatic processes: From Stroop to McGurk and beyond

Cognitive scientists typically classify cognitive processes as either controlled or automatic. Whereas controlled processes are slow and effortful, automatic processes are fast and involuntary. Over the past decade, we have propelled a research trajectory investigating how top-down influence in the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cortex 2013-02, Vol.49 (2), p.463-473
Main Authors: Lifshitz, Michael, Aubert Bonn, Noémie, Fischer, Alexandra, Kashem, Irene Farah, Raz, Amir
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Attention
Automatic process
Automation
Behavior - physiology
Cognitive ability
Cognitive Science
Humans
Hypnosis
Language
Nervous system
Practice (Psychology)
Psychomotor Performance - physiology
Replication
Self-regulation
Stroop Test
Suggestion
Therapeutic applications
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Summary:Cognitive scientists typically classify cognitive processes as either controlled or automatic. Whereas controlled processes are slow and effortful, automatic processes are fast and involuntary. Over the past decade, we have propelled a research trajectory investigating how top-down influence in the form of suggestion can allow individuals to modulate the automaticity of cognitive processes. Here we present an overarching array of converging findings that collectively indicate that certain individuals can derail involuntary processes, such as reading, by “unringing” the proverbial bell. We examine replications of these effects from both our own laboratory and independent groups, and extend our Stroop findings to several other well-established automatic paradigms, including the McGurk effect. We thus demonstrate how, in the case of highly suggestible individuals, suggestion seems to wield control over a process that is likely even more automatic than the Stroop effect. Finally, we present findings from two novel experimental paradigms exploring the potential of shifting automaticity in the opposite direction – i.e., transforming, without practice, a controlled task into one that is automatic. Drawing on related evidence from the neuroscience of contemplative practices, we discuss how these findings pave the road to a more scientific understanding of voluntary control and automaticity, and expound on their possible experimental and therapeutic applications.
ISSN:0010-9452
1973-8102
DOI:10.1016/j.cortex.2012.08.007