Empirical progress and nomic truth approximation revisited

•We show how to relate empirical progress to nomic truth approximation.•This is done on much weaker assumptions than before in our (2000).•The key is to consistently think in terms of truth and falsity content.•Nomic theories merely need to exclude certain conceptual possibilities.•Empirical progres...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Studies in history and philosophy of science. Part A 2014-06, Vol.46, p.64-72
Main Author: Kuipers, Theo A.F.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Approximation
Conceptual possibilities
Credibility
Empirical progress
Empirical tests
Epistemology
Falsity content
History of medicine and histology
Instrumentalism
Models, Theoretical
Nomic possibilities
Nomic truth approximation
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Realism
Science
Truth content
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Summary:•We show how to relate empirical progress to nomic truth approximation.•This is done on much weaker assumptions than before in our (2000).•The key is to consistently think in terms of truth and falsity content.•Nomic theories merely need to exclude certain conceptual possibilities.•Empirical progress remains measured in examples and counterexamples. In my From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) I have shown how an instrumentalist account of empirical progress can be related to nomic truth approximation. However, it was assumed that a strong notion of nomic theories was needed for that analysis. In this paper it is shown, in terms of truth and falsity content, that the analysis already applies when, in line with scientific common sense, nomic theories are merely assumed to exclude certain conceptual possibilities as nomic possibilities.
ISSN:0039-3681
1879-2510
DOI:10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.02.003