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Social contracts in wasp societies
THE stability of social groups requires that conflicts among group members somehow be resolved. Recent models predict that sub-ordinates may be allowed limited reproduction by dominant colony-mates as an inducement to stay and aid dominants 1– For such 'social contracts' to be evolutionari...
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Published in: | Nature (London) 1992-10, Vol.359 (6398), p.823-825 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | THE stability of social groups requires that conflicts among group members somehow be resolved. Recent models predict that sub-ordinates may be allowed limited reproduction by dominant colony-mates as an inducement to stay and aid dominants
1–
For such 'social contracts' to be evolutionarily stable, attempted reproductive cheating by dominants must be punishable
3
. In the eusocial paper wasp,
Polistes fuscatus
, subordinate queens that co-found nests with dominant queens usually disappear after the first workers emerge, so subordinates lay most of their reproductive-destined eggs just before worker emergence. Thus subordinates should be very sensitive to reproductive cheating during the latter period but relatively insensitive when worker-destined eggs are laid. Here we find in a series of egg-removal experiments designed to mimic egg-eating that subordinates do not change their aggressiveness when worker-destined eggs are removed, but that they greatly increase their aggression when reproductive-destined eggs are removed, especially when the queens are of similar size. |
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ISSN: | 0028-0836 1476-4687 |
DOI: | 10.1038/359823a0 |