Failure to collectively assess surveillance-oriented security technologies will inevitably lead to an absolute surveillance society

• Published in: Surveillance & society 2014-01, Vol.12 (1), p.73-88
• Main Author: Mitchener-Nissen, Timothy
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Biometrics; Freedom; Intervention; Methods; Privacy; Rights; Security; Society; Surveillance; Surveillance of citizens
• ISSN: 1477-7487; 1477-7487
• DOI: 10.24908/ss.v12i1.4364

The arguments presented by this paper are built on two underlying assertions. The first is that the assessment of surveillance measures often entails a judgement of whether any loss in privacy is legitimised by a justifiable increase in security. However one fundamental difference between privacy and security is that privacy has two attainable end-states (absolute privacy through to the absolute absence of privacy), whereas security has only one attainable end-state (while the absolute absence of security is attainable, absolute security is a desired yet unobtainable goal). The second assertion, which builds upon the first, holds that because absolute security is desirable new security interventions will continuously be developed each potentially trading a small measure of privacy for a small rise in security. When assessed individually each intervention may constitute a justifiable trade-off. However when combined together these interventions will ultimately reduce privacy to zero. To counter this outcome, when assessing the acceptability of any surveillance measure which impacts upon privacy (whether this constitutes a new technology or the novel application of existing technologies) we should do so by examining the combined effect of all surveillance measures currently employed within a society. This contrasts with the prevailing system whereby the impact of a new security technology is predominantly assessed on an individual basis by a subjective balancing of the security benefits of that technology against any reductions in concomitant rights, such as privacy and liberty. I contend that by continuing to focus on the effects of individual technologies over the combined effects of all surveillance technologies within a society, the likelihood of sleepwalking into (or indeed waking-up in) an absolute surveillance society moves from being a possible to the inevitable future. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]