A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games

•We compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games (games involving other-regarding preferences and games that are strategically challenging).•Students are more likely to behave as selfish and rational agents than non-students across the board.•The differ...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 2015-05, Vol.113, p.26-33
Main Authors: Belot, Michele, Duch, Raymond, Miller, Luis
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency theory
Behavioral decision theory
Comparative analysis
Convenience samples
Economic theory
Experimental games
Experiments
Game theory
Games
Laboratory experiments
Preferences
Public good
Selfishness
Students
Studies
Subject pools
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Summary:•We compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games (games involving other-regarding preferences and games that are strategically challenging).•Students are more likely to behave as selfish and rational agents than non-students across the board.•The differences are most pronounced in games involving other-regarding preferences and are less pronounced in games that are cognitively more demanding. This study exploits the opening of the experimental lab in Oxford to compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games, some of which involve other-regarding preferences (Trust Game, Dictator Game, and Public Goods Game) and others which have game forms that are strategically challenging (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction). We find that students are more likely to behave as selfish and rational agents than non-students. Our findings suggest that students are different than non-students with respect to their social preferences and their ability to reason strategically. Experiments using students are likely to overestimate the extent of selfish and rational behavior in the general population.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.007