Information disclosure and peer effects in the use of antibiotics

Mandatory information disclosure may allow sellers to observe and respond to other sellers’ attributes (seller peer effects) as well as informing consumers of the sellers’ attributes (consumer learning effect). Using the data from mandatory information disclosure of antibiotic prescription rates for...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of health economics 2015-07, Vol.42, p.1-16
Main Authors: Kwon, Illoong, Jun, Daesung
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anti-Bacterial Agents - therapeutic use
Antibiotic overuse
Antibiotics
Clinics
Competition
Consumers
Disclosure
Economic Competition
Economics
Health
Health administration
Humans
Information disclosure
Information Dissemination
Learning
Market structure
Markets
Peer effects
Peer Group
Practice Patterns, Physicians' - trends
Prescriptions
Republic of Korea
Studies
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Summary:Mandatory information disclosure may allow sellers to observe and respond to other sellers’ attributes (seller peer effects) as well as informing consumers of the sellers’ attributes (consumer learning effect). Using the data from mandatory information disclosure of antibiotic prescription rates for the common cold in Korea, this paper shows that while average prescription rates decreased after the disclosure, more than 30% of the clinics increased their antibiotic prescriptions. Moreover, clinics that were prescribing relatively fewer antibiotics than other local clinics before the disclosure requirement were more likely to increase their prescription rate. The average prescription rates also declined less in markets with stronger clinic competition. These results are consistent with seller peer effects.
ISSN:0167-6296
1879-1646
DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.10.008