Fighting as a profit maximizing strategy in the National Hockey League: more evidence

This article estimates the effect of fighting in hockey games on attendance in the National Hockey League (NHL) over the 1997-1998 through 2009-2010 seasons. After estimating a system of equations developed from a model of a profit-maximizing club owner, it was found that fighting had a small negati...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Applied economics 2016-01, Vol.48 (4), p.292-299
Main Author: Rockerbie, Duane W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Attendance
Economic models
Fighting
Ice hockey
NHL
Professional hockey
Profit maximization
revenue
Sports franchises
Studies
Ticket sales
United States
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Summary:This article estimates the effect of fighting in hockey games on attendance in the National Hockey League (NHL) over the 1997-1998 through 2009-2010 seasons. After estimating a system of equations developed from a model of a profit-maximizing club owner, it was found that fighting had a small negative effect on attendance implying that encouraging fighting on the ice is not a profit-maximizing strategy. The results are quite robust when incorporating capacity constraints on attendance and exogenous ticket pricing. Other factors that determine club performance and market size were found to significantly affect attendance. The empirical results also suggest that NHL club owners are maximizing profit.
ISSN:0003-6846
1466-4283
DOI:10.1080/00036846.2015.1078446