Who Gives, Who Gains? Progressivity and Preferences

The extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue and show formally that these variations—largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution—reflect in part the design of tax and transf...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative political studies 2016-03, Vol.49 (4), p.529-563
Main Authors: Beramendi, Pablo, Rehm, Philipp
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Game theory
Income
Income redistribution
Industrial policy
Politics
Power
Public support
Social policy
Taxation
Welfare
Welfare state
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Summary:The extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue and show formally that these variations—largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution—reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity. When progressivity is high, politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify. When progressivity is low, and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap, redistributive struggles become politically less salient. We test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies. Our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution.
ISSN:0010-4140
1552-3829
DOI:10.1177/0010414015617961