Corruption and bicameral reforms

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to 'hard time constraints', and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lob...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2016-08, Vol.47 (2), p.387-411
Main Authors: Facchini, Giovanni, Testa, Cecilia
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Alternative voting
Bargaining
Bargaining power
Bicameral legislatures
Bicameralism
Congressional legislation
Corruption
Decision making
Econometrics
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Elgar, Edward
Game Theory
Government shutdowns
International Political Economy
Legislation
Legislators
Legislatures
Lobbying
Negotiation
Original Paper
Political science
Politics
Power
Proposals
Public Finance
Public officials
Reforms
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
State budgets
Studies
Testa
Unicameral legislatures
United States
Veto
Voters
Voting
Voting behaviour
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Summary:During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to 'hard time constraints', and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers' bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9