Leverage and strategic preemption: Lessons from entry plans and incumbent investments

This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low-lever...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of financial economics 2017-02, Vol.123 (2), p.292-312
Main Author: Cookson, J. Anthony
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Casino industry
Casinos
Entry threats
Financial constraints
Impact analysis
Leverage
Preemption
Studies
United States
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Summary:This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low-leverage incumbents expand physical capacity (by 30%), whereas high-leverage incumbents do not. This difference in investment matters because capacity installations preempt eventual entry. Stock market reactions to withdrawn plans imply that effective preemption increases incumbent firm value by 5%. My findings suggest that leverage matters for industry composition, not just firm-level investment.
ISSN:0304-405X
1879-2774
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.11.005