Two Models of Moral Judgment

This paper compares two theories and their two corresponding computational models of human moral judgment. In order to better address psychological realism and generality of theories of moral judgment, more detailed and more psychologically nuanced models are needed. In particular, a motivationally...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cognitive science 2018-05, Vol.42 (S1), p.4-37
Main Authors: Bretz, Shane, Sun, Ron
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognitive architecture
Cognitive modeling
Computer applications
Explicit
Implicit
Mathematical models
Moral judgment
Motivation
Simulation
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Summary:This paper compares two theories and their two corresponding computational models of human moral judgment. In order to better address psychological realism and generality of theories of moral judgment, more detailed and more psychologically nuanced models are needed. In particular, a motivationally based theory of moral judgment (and its corresponding computational model) is developed in this paper that provides a more accurate account of human moral judgment than an existing emotion‐reason conflict theory. Simulations based on the theory capture and explain a range of relevant human data. They account not only for the original data that were used to support the emotion–reason conflict theory, but also for a wider range of data and phenomena.
ISSN:0364-0213
1551-6709
DOI:10.1111/cogs.12517