Close counterfactuals and almost doing the impossible

• Published in: Psychonomic bulletin & review 2024-02, Vol.31 (1), p.187-195
• Main Authors: Doan, Tiffany, Denison, Stephanie, Friedman, Ori
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Behavioral Science and Psychology; Brief Report; Cognitive Psychology; Emotions; Experiments; Humans; Judgment; Probability; Psychology
• ISSN: 1069-9384; 1531-5320
• DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02335-w

Can we feel that an unrealized outcome nearly happened if it was never possible in the first place? People often consider counterfactual events that did not happen, and some counterfactuals seem so close to reality that people say they “almost” or “easily could have” happened. Across four preregistered experiments (total N = 1,228), we investigated how judgments of counterfactual closeness depend on possibility, and whether this varies across two kinds of close counterfactuals. In judging whether outcomes almost happened, participants were more strongly impacted by possibility than by incremental manipulations of probability. In contrast, when judging whether outcomes easily could have happened, participants treated the distinction between impossible and possible like any other variation in probability. Both kinds of judgments were also impacted by propensity, though these effects were comparatively small. Together, these findings reveal novel differences between the two kinds of close counterfactuals and suggest that while possibility is privileged when judging what almost happened, probability is the focus when judging what easily could have happened.