Provably secure authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

• Published in: ACM transactions on information and system security 2007-07, Vol.10 (3), p.10
• Main Authors: Bresson, Emmanuel, Chevassut, Olivier, Pointcheval, David
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• ISSN: 1094-9224; 1557-7406
• DOI: 10.1145/1266977.1266979

Authenticated key-exchange protocols allow two participants A and B , communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B ) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A ) can learn any information about the agreed value and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous two-party Diffie--Hellman (DH) key-exchange protocol and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multiparty setting for over a decade and, in the past few years, completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.