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Security analysis of the song-mitchell authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags
In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the most efficient authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to...
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| Published in: | IEEE communications letters 2009-04, Vol.13 (4), p.274-276 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-3f940ae2c858b4fc1b06c944507d00bc4925bb5697e238ba212ab5fdbdaed5663 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-3f940ae2c858b4fc1b06c944507d00bc4925bb5697e238ba212ab5fdbdaed5663 |
| container_end_page | 276 |
| container_issue | 4 |
| container_start_page | 274 |
| container_title | IEEE communications letters |
| container_volume | 13 |
| creator | Rizomiliotis, P. Rekleitis, E. Gritzalis, S. |
| description | In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the most efficient authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to desynchronize a tag. The attack is very efficient and has minimal computational complexity. Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/LCOMM.2009.082117 |
| format | article |
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A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to desynchronize a tag. The attack is very efficient and has minimal computational complexity. Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1089-7798</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1558-2558</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/LCOMM.2009.082117</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ICLEF6</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York, NY: IEEE</publisher><subject>Access methods and protocols, osi model ; Access protocols ; Algorithm design and analysis ; Applied sciences ; Authentication ; Communication system security ; Computation ; Cryptographic protocols ; Cryptography ; Data security ; Exact sciences and technology ; Information, signal and communications theory ; Mathematical models ; Monitoring ; Privacy ; protocol ; Radio frequency identification ; Radiolocalization and radionavigation ; Readers ; RFID tags ; Security ; Servers ; Signal and communications theory ; Tags ; Telecommunications ; Telecommunications and information theory ; Teleprocessing networks. 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Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw.</description><subject>Access methods and protocols, osi model</subject><subject>Access protocols</subject><subject>Algorithm design and analysis</subject><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>Authentication</subject><subject>Communication system security</subject><subject>Computation</subject><subject>Cryptographic protocols</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Data security</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information, signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Monitoring</subject><subject>Privacy</subject><subject>protocol</subject><subject>Radio frequency identification</subject><subject>Radiolocalization and radionavigation</subject><subject>Readers</subject><subject>RFID tags</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>Servers</subject><subject>Signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Tags</subject><subject>Telecommunications</subject><subject>Telecommunications and information theory</subject><subject>Teleprocessing networks. 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A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to desynchronize a tag. The attack is very efficient and has minimal computational complexity. Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw.</abstract><cop>New York, NY</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/LCOMM.2009.082117</doi><tpages>3</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1089-7798 |
| ispartof | IEEE communications letters, 2009-04, Vol.13 (4), p.274-276 |
| issn | 1089-7798 1558-2558 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_34534765 |
| source | IEEE Xplore (Online service) |
| subjects | Access methods and protocols, osi model Access protocols Algorithm design and analysis Applied sciences Authentication Communication system security Computation Cryptographic protocols Cryptography Data security Exact sciences and technology Information, signal and communications theory Mathematical models Monitoring Privacy protocol Radio frequency identification Radiolocalization and radionavigation Readers RFID tags Security Servers Signal and communications theory Tags Telecommunications Telecommunications and information theory Teleprocessing networks. Isdn |
| title | Security analysis of the song-mitchell authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags |
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