Campaign Spending Regulation in a Model of Redistributive Politics

We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fractio...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2006-05, Vol.28 (1), p.95-124
Main Authors: Sahuguet, Nicolas, Persico, Nicola
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budgets
Campaign expenditures
Campaign finance
Competition
Economic models
Economic theory
Electoral campaigning
Equilibrium
Expenditures
Income redistribution
Inequality
Mathematical methods
Political advertising
Political campaigns
Political candidates
Political economy
Political elections
Political parties
Political regulation
Politics
Regulation
Reimbursement
Spending
Studies
Voters
Voting
Voting behavior
Voting behaviour
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Summary:We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducting the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-005-0610-0