An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races

Lewis Frye Richardson's simple differential equations model of armaments races has been long criticized for its lack of incorporation of the goals of nations. Using the mathematics of optimal control theory, the authors formulate a model which incorporates national goals into an “arms balance”...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American political science review 1977-03, Vol.71 (1), p.226-244
Main Authors: Gillespie, John V., Zinnes, Dina A., Tahim, G.S., Schrodt, Philip A., Rubison, R. Michael
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Arms race
Arms races
Autocorrelation
Control theory
Control variables
Mathematical expressions
Military alliances
Modeling
NATO
Optimal control
Peacetime
Trajectories
U.S.A
U.S.S.R
World Trade Organization
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Lewis Frye Richardson's simple differential equations model of armaments races has been long criticized for its lack of incorporation of the goals of nations. Using the mathematics of optimal control theory, the authors formulate a model which incorporates national goals into an “arms balance” objective function. The goals used are based on the traditional concerns in the balance-of-power literature. From an objective function together with the Richardson model an optimal armaments policy is derived. The United States-Soviet, NATO-WTO, and Arab-Israeli arms races are used as empirical examples, and the parameters in the model are estimated by means of functional minimization techniques. The optimal control model is further examined for its equilibrium and stability properties. The equilibrium and stability conditions are assessed with respect to the empirical examples. The findings are that while the United States and the Soviet Union in direct confrontation pursue strategies that lead to a lack of equilibrium and stability, when taken as part of NATO and WTO, the major powers and their alliance partners do pursue stable and equilibrium strategies. The Israeli policy is found to lead to equilibrium and stability while the Arab policy does not.
ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.1017/S0003055400259406