Explaining the formation of minimal coalitions: antisystem parties and antipact rules

Recent theoretical arguments hold that the institutional setting of a political system influences coalition formation. Empirical analyses that confront these hypotheses have, however, been slow to emerge. We provide a first test of the relation between coalition formation and one element within this...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of political research 2006-10, Vol.45 (6), p.957-984
Main Authors: Geys, B, Heyndels, B, Vermeir, J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Belgium
Coalitions
Institutions
Political parties
Political science research
Political systems
Political theory
Right-wing parties
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Recent theoretical arguments hold that the institutional setting of a political system influences coalition formation. Empirical analyses that confront these hypotheses have, however, been slow to emerge. We provide a first test of the relation between coalition formation and one element within this institutional setting: the existence of commitments not to join forces with certain `pariah' parties (i.e., anti-pact rules). Specifically, we study the effect of the `cordon sanitaire' around the Flemish extreme right-wing party Vlaams Blok over the period from 1976 to 2000. The results show that the refusal to coalesce with Vlaams Blok significantly affects the probability that `minimal winning', `minimal number' and `minimal size' coalitions are formed. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers
ISSN:0304-4130
DOI:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00640.x