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Emergence of Captive Finance Companies and Risk Segmentation in Loan Markets: Theory and Evidence

A seller with some degree of market power in its product market can earn rents. In this context, there is a gain to granting credit to purchase of the product and thus to the establishment of a captive finance company. This paper examines the optimal behavior of such a durable good seller and its ca...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of money, credit and banking credit and banking, 2008-02, Vol.40 (1), p.173-192
Main Authors: BARRON, JOHN M., CHONG, BYUNG-UK, STATEN, MICHAEL E.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:A seller with some degree of market power in its product market can earn rents. In this context, there is a gain to granting credit to purchase of the product and thus to the establishment of a captive finance company. This paper examines the optimal behavior of such a durable good seller and its captive finance company. The model predicts a critical difference between the captive finance company's credit standard and that of independent lenders ("banks"), namely, that the captive finance company will adopt a more lenient credit standard. Thus, we should expect the likelihood of repayment of a captive loan to be lower than that of a bank loan, other things equal. This prediction is tested using a unique data set drawn from a major credit bureau in the United States, and the evidence supports the theoretical prediction.
ISSN:0022-2879
1538-4616
DOI:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00108.x