Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability & Interbranch Relations

• Published in: Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.) Mass.), 2008-09, Vol.137 (4), p.16-27
• Main Author: Burbank, Stephen B.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Administrative responsibility; Analysis; Court hearings & proceedings; Federal court judges; Federal courts; Federal law; Interest groups; Judges; Judges & magistrates; Judicial power; Judicial process; Judicial system; Judiciary; Judiciary power; Law; Legislation; National politics; Norms; Political aspects; Political elections; Political independence; Political interest groups; Political philosophy; Political systems; Politicians; Politics; Powers and duties; Salience; Social aspects; State politics
• ISSN: 0011-5266; 1548-6192
• DOI: 10.1162/daed.2008.137.4.16

At both the federal and state levels, these strategies enable interest groups to wield influence by framing judicial selection in terms of the supposed causal influence of a vote in favor of or against a judicial nominee or candidate on results in high salience cases, such as those involving the death penalty or abortion. The two are not at war with each other but rather are complements; neither is an end in itself but rather a means to an end (or variety of ends) ; the relevant ends relate not primarily to individual judicial performance but rather to the performance of courts and court systems ; and there is no one ideal mix of independence and accountability, but rather the right mix depends upon the goals of those responsible for institutional architecture with respect to a particular court or court system.3 From these premises I derive several additional propositions that are helpful in considering the role of interbranch relations in maintaining a desired balance between judicial accountability and judicial independence.