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Mobility and the role of education as a commitment device
In closed economies, human capital investment faces a hold-up problem of excessive redistributive taxation. Increased international labor mobility, however, changes the constraints which affect optimal education and tax policy. We show that in a non-altruistic, gerontocratic world, investments in hu...
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Published in: | International tax and public finance 2003-09, Vol.10 (5), p.549-564 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | In closed economies, human capital investment faces a hold-up problem of excessive redistributive taxation. Increased international labor mobility, however, changes the constraints which affect optimal education and tax policy. We show that in a non-altruistic, gerontocratic world, investments in human capital which increase the mobility of the young generation can be interpreted as a commitment device overcoming the hold-up problem. This is in line with Kehoe (1989) who derives a similar result with respect to capital mobility. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers |
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ISSN: | 0927-5940 1573-6970 |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1026170206971 |